

Commonwealth of Kentucky  
Supreme Court  
CASE NO. 2017-SC-000537-TG



COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

APPELLANT

v.

Appeal from Fayette Circuit Court  
Hon. Ernesto Scorsone, Judge  
Indictment No. 15-CR-584-002

JUSTIN SMITH

APPELLEE

---

**Brief for Commonwealth**

---

Submitted by,

**ANDY BESHEAR**

Attorney General of Kentucky

**JASON B. MOORE**

Assistant Attorney General  
Office of Criminal Appeals  
Office of the Attorney General  
1024 Capital Center Drive  
Frankfort, Ky. 40601  
(502) 696-5342

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on October 3, 2018, the foregoing Brief for the Commonwealth was served, first class, postage pre-paid, U.S. mail to Hon. Ernesto Scorsone, Judge, Fayette Circuit Court, Robert F. Stephens Circuit Courthouse, 120 North Limestone, Lexington, Kentucky 40507; and via state messenger mail to Hon. Brandon Neil Jewell, Asst. Public Advocate, Dept. Of Public Advocacy, 5 Mill Creek, Section 100, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601, counsel for appellee, and via electronic mail to Hon. Lou Anna Red Corn, Fayette County Commonwealth Attorney. I further certify that the record on appeal has been returned to the Clerk of this Court.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. B. Moore".

Jason B. Moore  
Assistant Attorney General

## INTRODUCTION

The Commonwealth brings this interlocutory appeal from an order of the Fayette Circuit Court declaring imposition of the death penalty against a person who was over eighteen but less than twenty-one years of age at the time of the offense unconstitutional. This appeal is brought pursuant to KRS 22A.020(4), and this Court accepted jurisdiction upon granting the Commonwealth's motion to transfer under CR 74.02.

## STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT

The Commonwealth requests oral argument in this matter as the case presents a question of first impression with great implication on the lower courts.

**STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

**INTRODUCTION** ..... i

KRS 22A.020(4) ..... i

CR 74.02..... i

**STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT**..... i

**STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**..... ii

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE**..... 1

*Roper v. Smimons*, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).....3

*Commonwealth v. Travis Bredhold*, Fayette Circuit Court No. 14-CR-161.....4

*Commonwealth v. Travis Bredhold*, 2017-SC-000436-TG .....4

**ARGUMENT**.....5

**I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXTENDING THE “BRIGHT-LINE RULE” FROM *ROPER* TO OFFENDERS BETWEEN THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN AND TWENTY-ONE AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE** ...5

**A. Preservation and Standard of Review**.....5

*Burke v. Commonwealth*, 506 S.W.3d 307, 313 (Ky. 2016).....6

**B. *Roper* and its progeny** .....6

*Stanford v. Kentucky*, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).....6

*Trop v. Dulles*, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958) .....6

*Atkins v. Virginia*, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) .....7

*Thompson v. Oklahoma*, 487 U.S. 815, 833-838 (1988) .....8

*Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).....8

*Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).....9

*Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 136 S.Ct. 718, 735 (2016).....10



<b>C. Attempts to extend <i>Roper</i> and its progeny to offenders over the age of eighteen have been uniformly rejected by the courts</b> .....	10
<i>Hill v. State</i> , 921 So.2d 579 (Fla. 2006) .....	11
<i>T.C. Bowling v. Commonwealth</i> , 224 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. 2006) .....	11
<i>Mitchell v. State</i> , 235 P.3d 640, 658-659 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010) .....	12
<i>People v. Powell</i> , --- P.3d ---, --- 2018 WL 4402113 at *32 (Cal. 2018).....	13
<i>Thompson v. State</i> , 153 So.3d 84 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) .....	13
<i>Romero v. State</i> , 105 So.3d 550 (Fla. 2012) .....	14
<i>United States v. Marshall</i> , 736 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2013) .....	15
<i>United States v. Lopez-Cabrera</i> , 2015 WL 3880503 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2015) .....	16
<i>Nicodemus v. State</i> , 392 P.3d 408 (Wyo. 2017).....	17
<i>Bear Cloud v. State</i> , 294 P.3d 36, 45 (Wyo. 2013) .....	18
<i>Otte v. State</i> , 96 N.E.3d 1288 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) .....	18
<i>In re Ronald Phillips</i> , 6th Cir. No. 17-3729 (July 20, 2017) .....	19
<i>Branch v. State</i> , 236 So.3d 981, 985-987 (Fla. 2018).....	19
<i>Zebroski v. State</i> , 179 A.3d 855 (Del. 2018) .....	20
<b>D. The trial court erred in finding a national consensus against imposing the death penalty on persons under the age of twenty-one</b> .....	21
<i>Penry v. Lynaugh</i> , 492 U.S. 302 (1989).....	23
<i>Glossip v. Gross</i> , 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2733-2734 (2015) .....	25
<i>Baze v. Rees</i> , 553 U.S. 35 (2008) .....	26
<b>E. The science the trial court relied upon is simply not new</b> .....	27
<i>Roper</i> , Brief of <i>Amici Curiae</i> for the American Psychological Association, 2004 WL 1636447 .....	28
<i>Morton v. State</i> , 995 So.2d 233 (Fla. 2008).....	28
Jay D. Aronson, <i>Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty</i> , 13 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 115, 120 (2007) .....	29
<i>Zebroski v. State</i> , 179 A.3d 855, 862 (Del. 2018) .....	31
<b>CONCLUSION</b> .....	32

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellee, Justin Smith, was indicted by a Fayette County grand jury on June 23, 2015, and charged with one count of murder, two counts of first-degree robbery, and one count each of tampering with physical evidence and first-degree fleeing or evading police (TR I, 23-24).<sup>1</sup> The charges arose from the April 17, 2015, shooting of Jonathan Krueger (Id.).

The events leading to the charges began when Mr. Krueger and Aaron Gillette – while walking home – observed a van driving the wrong way on Maxwell Street, a one-way street in Lexington (TR I, 13).<sup>2</sup> Mr. Krueger and Mr. Gillette attempted to notify the driver of the van that he was travelling in the wrong direction (Id.) The van then turned onto Transylvania Avenue, two subjects exited the van armed with handguns, and approached Mr. Krueger and Mr. Gillette (Id.).

Mr. Gillette advised police the subjects demanded he and Mr. Krueger give them their property (Id.). Mr. Gillette resisted the demands and attempted to defend himself from them, and then shots began to fire (Id.). After struggling with one of the subjects, Mr. Gillette was able to flee to a nearby fence line while he continued to hear gunshots being fired (Id.). The subjects then returned to the van and it fled from the scene (Id.). When officers

---

<sup>1</sup> Two co-defendants – Efrain Diaz, Jr. and Roman Gonzalez, Jr. – were jointly indicted with Diaz in this matter (TR I, 29-30).

<sup>2</sup> As this appeal concerns a ruling made prior to the trial of this matter, the Commonwealth relies upon factual assertions from probable cause affidavits contained in the record for its statement of the case.



arrived, they found Mr. Krueger unresponsive with apparent gunshot wounds (Id.). He was transported to the University of Kentucky Hospital, where he subsequently died (Id.).

A description of the van and subjects was broadcast over the police radio system, and a matching vehicle was observed near 226 Sutton Place in Lexington (TR I, 18). When officers attempted to stop the vehicle, it fled, but officers were able to capture the license plate information (Id.). Officers then located the vehicle at 2638 Le Harve Road, the address where it was registered (Id.). Upon locating the vehicle, officers observed a subject wearing a black tank top and blue shorts walk away from the driver's door of the van and into the front door of the residence (Id.).

Officers then approached the residence and made contact with Jaaron Smith who advised his brother, Justin, was the person who had recently been using the van (Id.). Officers were advised Justin Smith was inside the residence, but refused to exit (Id.). Approximately two hours after officers arrived, Justin Smith exited the residence (Id.). He was wearing a black tank top and blue shorts, and was identified by an officer as the person observed walking from the van and into the residence (Id.).

Smith was transported to the police department where he told detectives he had participated in the robbery of Mr. Gillette and Mr. Krueger and the murder of Mr. Krueger (TR I, 20). Smith also informed police that Diaz and Gonzalez, Jr. had participated in the commission of the crimes (Id.). Smith

was subsequently arrested on charges of murder, first-degree robbery and tampering with physical evidence by the Lexington Police (TR I, 5-6). At the time the crimes were committed – April 17, 2015 – Smith, who was born on October 24, 1996, was eighteen years and five months old.

Smith was arraigned on the charges in the indictment on July 2, 2015, and entered a plea of not guilty (TR I, 48). The Commonwealth gave notice of aggravating circumstance and intent to seek the death penalty on November 3, 2015 (TR I, 66-67). Specifically, the Commonwealth alleged the aggravating circumstance that the murder of Mr. Krueger was committed during the commission of first-degree robbery (Id.). On December 16, 2016, the trial court scheduled this matter for a jury trial beginning October 2, 2017, and continuing for a period of four weeks (TR II, 202).

On June 13, 2017, Smith filed a motion to exclude the death penalty as a sentencing option at trial (TR II, 286-303). Specifically, Smith moved the trial court to extend the holding of *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), wherein the United States Supreme Court held capital punishment was unlawful for persons under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense (Id.). Smith requested the trial court extend this prohibition to include persons under the age of twenty-one at the time of the offense (Id.). A second motion seeking the same relief was filed with the trial court on June 23, 2017 (TR III, 313-321).



At the same time this motion and memorandum was filed by Smith, an identical motion were filed on behalf of co-defendant, Efrain Diaz.<sup>3</sup> On July 14, 2017, Smith supplemented his motion to remove the death penalty with an affidavit of Dr. Ken Benedict (TR III, 347-354). Therein, Dr. Benedict opined Smith had a developmental age of less than eighteen (18) at the time of the offense (Id.). An evidentiary hearing on the motions was held on July 17, 2017, where the trial court heard testimony from Dr. Laurence Steinberg regarding maturational differences between adolescents and adults (VR, 7/17/17, 8:27:56-9:26:13).

On September 7, 2017, the trial court entered an “order declaring Kentucky’s death penalty statute as unconstitutional.” (TR III, 375-387). In so holding, the trial court concluded there was a national consensus against imposing the death penalty on offenders under the age of twenty-one (Id. at 380), and that scientific evidence “support[ed] the conclusion that individuals under twenty-one (21) years of age are categorically less culpable in the same ways that the Court in *Roper* decided individuals under eighteen (18) were less culpable.” (Id. at 380). An amended order making the same finding and conclusions was entered by the trial court on September 12, 2017 (TR III, 388-400).

---

<sup>3</sup> An identical motion was also filed in the case of *Commonwealth v. Travis Bredhold*, Fayette Circuit Court No. 14-CR-161. The Fayette Circuit Court also granted the motion in that case and the Commonwealth’s appeal from the order is pending before this Court in *Commonwealth v. Bredhold*, 2017-SC-000436-TG.



The Commonwealth filed its notice of appeal from the interlocutory orders on September 22, 2017 (TR III, 408-409), and this Court granted the Commonwealth's motion to transfer the appeal from the Court of Appeals.

Additional facts will be set forth below in support of the Commonwealth's argument.

## **ARGUMENT**

### **I.**

#### **THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXTENDING THE "BRIGHT-LINE RULE" FROM *ROPER* TO OFFENDERS BETWEEN THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN AND TWENTY-ONE AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE**

In its order declaring the death penalty unconstitutional for offenders older than eighteen but younger than twenty-one at the time of the offense, the trial court made an extension of the holding of *Roper* and its progeny that every state appellate court and federal court has rejected in the twelve years since *Roper* was decided. This Court should follow those courts, and reverse the trial court's decision.

#### **A. Preservation and Standard of Review**

The issue presented in this matter is properly preserved for review by this Court by the Commonwealth's response in opposition to the motion to exclude death penalty (TR III, 326-333; 334-341). As this case presents an issue of the lower court finding a statute unconstitutional, this Court's

standard of review is *de novo* with a presumption the statute is constitutional. *Burke v. Commonwealth*, 506 S.W.3d 307, 313 (Ky. 2016).

**B. *Roper* and its progeny**

In 2005, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered whether it was permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments “to execute a juvenile offender who was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime.” *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 551. The Court had previously considered this question in a case from this Court, *Stanford v. Kentucky*, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and held there was no constitutional violation.

In *Roper*, the Court noted its framework for evaluating “which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual” looks to “‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 561 quoting *Trop v. Dulles*, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958) (plurality opinion). In applying this framework, a court must begin with “a review of the objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.” *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 564. The court “then must determine, in the exercise of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.” *Id.*

In *Roper*, the Court noted in considering the first prong of the framework that “30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express



provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach.” 543 U.S. at 564. Additionally, since the Court’s decision in *Stanford*, only six states had carried out an execution of a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the offense. *Id.* Based on these statistics, the Supreme Court concluded “the objective indicia of consensus in this case ... provide sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles, in the words *Atkins* used respecting the mentally retarded, as ‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’ ” *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 567 quoting *Atkins v. Virginia*, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).

The Supreme Court then turned to the question of whether the death penalty was disproportionate for juvenile capital offenders. There, the Court noted “three differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.” *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 569. The first difference was “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” which “often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.” *Id.* Based on this lessened maturity and sense of responsibility, “almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.” *Id.*

Secondly, the Court found juveniles “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” *Id.* And thirdly, “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.” *Id.* at 570. The Court then adopted the recognition of these character

differences from the *Thompson v. Oklahoma*, 487 U.S. 815, 833-838 (1988), plurality opinion to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen. *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 570.

The Court, however, recognized the problem with setting a categorical rule that the death penalty could not be imposed on offenders under the age of eighteen, and, at least implicitly anticipated and rejected, the claim now being made in this case. In doing so, the Court stated:

Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 will have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn. The plurality opinion in *Thompson* drew the line at 16. In the intervening years the *Thompson* plurality's conclusion that offenders under 16 may not be executed has not been challenged. The logic of *Thompson* extends to those who are under 18. The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.

*Id.* at 574.

The Supreme Court returned to a consideration of juvenile sentencing in *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). There, the Court consider whether it violated the Eighth Amendment to sentence juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole for non-homicide offenses. *Id.* at 52-53. Relying on the same character differences between juveniles under eighteen and adults noted in *Roper*, the Court again imposed a categorical rule that “[t]he Constitution



prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” *Id.* at 82.

Importantly, the Court in *Graham* continued to draw the line between a juvenile and an adult offender at the age of eighteen that had been drawn in *Roper*. This is so, despite the Court’s recognition that “parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence.” *Id.* at 68.

In 2012, in *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), the Supreme Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” There, the Court was considering two cases where two fourteen years olds had been convicted of murder and sentenced to life without parole pursuant to a statutory mandate. *Id.*

The Supreme Court’s concern in *Miller* was that a mandatory LWOP sentencing scheme “prevents those meting out punishment from considering a juvenile’s ‘lessened culpability’ and greater ‘capacity for change,’ and runs afoul of our cases’ requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties.” *Id.* In other words, the mandatory nature of the sentencing scheme precluded the sentencer from considering the character differences between juveniles and adults established in *Roper*.

“By removing youth from the balance – by subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult – these laws prohibit

a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender" in contravention to the foundational principle of *Roper* and *Graham*, "that imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children." *Miller*, 567 U.S. at 474. Again, as in *Graham*, the Court continued to draw the line of demarcation between juvenile offenders and adults at the bright-line age of eighteen established in *Roper*.

Most recently, the Supreme Court considered the retroactivity of its decision in *Miller* and further held that offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of their offenses are entitled to a hearing where "youth and its attendant characteristics – the same characteristics developed in *Roper* – are considered as sentencing factors. *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 136 S.Ct. 718, 735 (2016). *Montgomery* described that *Miller* "rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for 'a class of defendants because of their status' – that is, juvenile offenders *whose crimes* reflect the transient immaturity of youth." *Id.* at 734. The Court, however, continued to limit the reach of its decision to those offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense.

**C. Attempts to extend *Roper* and its progeny to offenders over the age of eighteen have been uniformly rejected by the courts**

In the immediate aftermath of the *Roper* decision, predictably, attempts began to extend it to offenders over the age of eighteen. Those attempts have been resoundingly rejected, including by this Court.



In *Hill v. State*, 921 So.2d 579 (Fla. 2006), the Florida Supreme Court rejected a claim that *Roper* should be extended to a death sentenced defendant whose “mental and emotional age places him in the category of persons for whom it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty under *Roper*.” *Id.* at 584. The Florida court rejected the claim summarily. “*Roper* does not apply to Hill. Hill was twenty-three years old when he committed the crimes at issue. *Roper* only prohibits the execution of those defendants whose *chronological* age is below eighteen.” *Id.* (emphasis original).

That same year, this Court was asked to extend *Roper* in *T.C. Bowling v. Commonwealth*, 224 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. 2006). In that case, Thomas Clyde Bowling moved to vacate his death sentence pursuant to *Roper* by alleging “that he mentally functions at a level equivalent to an eleven-year-old child.” *Id.* at 579. In seeking to have *Roper* apply, Bowling argued “that unlike the Supreme Court’s prior decisions dealing with the juvenile death penalty, *Roper* defines ‘juvenile’ and ‘youthful person’ in terms of the mental development and impairments that are inherent in anyone that functions as a juvenile, not just those who are chronologically juvenile.” *Id.* at 582.

In support of his argument, Bowling noted that *Roper* “focuse[d] on the immaturity, irresponsibility, and susceptibility to negative influences in juveniles,” and, therefore, “the Court was clearly imposing a broad restriction against the execution of any offender who mentally functions” as a juvenile. *Id.* This Court, however, rejected that argument because “the plain language

of *Roper* compels the conclusion that its prohibition is limited to ‘the execution of an offender for any crime committed before his 18th birthday....’ *Id.* at 583 quoting *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 588 (O’Connor, J. dissenting).

Following this Court’s decision in *Bowling*, and relying heavily upon it, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected a claim seeking to extend *Roper* to a defendant “only two weeks past his eighteenth birthday when he killed the deceased[.]” *Mitchell v. State*, 235 P.3d 640, 658-659 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010). In that case, the defendant “assert[ed] his lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, his vulnerability to outside influences, and character deficiencies exclude him from the death penalty.” *Id.* at 658.

The Oklahoma court rejected the defendant’s argument in large part based upon this Court’s decision in *Bowling*, *supra*. In so holding, the Oklahoma court stated plainly:

We find the *Bowling* decision well reasoned and persuasive. Appellant has not cited any authority to the contrary. The U.S. Supreme Court has drawn a bright line at eighteen (18) years of age for death eligibility and we therefore reject Appellant’s argument that being two weeks beyond his eighteenth birthday at the time of the murder exempts him from capital punishment. Under the plain language of *Roper*, the prohibition against capital punishment is limited to the execution of an offender for any crime committed before his 18th birthday.

*Id.* at 659.

In *People v. Gamache*, 227 P.3d 342, 392 (Cal. 2010), the California Supreme Court also rebuffed a claim that “imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed as an 18 year old violates ‘Fundamental Notions of Justice.’”



The California court held “[n]either the Eighth Amendment and equal protection clause of the federal Constitution nor the corresponding provisions of the California Constitution per se prohibit death as punishment for crimes committed when 18 years of age.” *Id.*

The California court continued:

We previously have rejected the argument that a death penalty scheme that treats differently those who are 18 years of age and older, and those younger than 18, violates equal protection. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has concluded the federal Constitution draws precisely this line, prohibiting the death penalty for those younger than 18 years of age, but not for those 18 years of age and older.

Nor does consideration of “evolving standards of decency” under the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution lead us to a different conclusion. When the United States Supreme Court recently considered this issue, it identified an emergent national consensus that execution of individuals for crimes committed when younger than 18 years of age was cruel and unusual. It identified no comparable consensus for crimes committed by those age 18 or older. Accordingly, we cannot say evolving standards of decency require abolition of the death penalty for crimes committed by 18 year olds.

*Gamanche*, 227 P.3d at 392. The California Supreme Court has very recently reaffirmed its holding in *Gamanche*. See *People v. Powell*, --- P.3d ---, --- 2018 WL 4402113 at \*32 (Cal. 2018) (“*Roper* teaches that a death sentence against an adult is not unconstitutional merely because that person may share certain qualities with some juveniles.”).

In *Thompson v. State*, 153 So.3d 84 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals likewise joined this Court in rejecting an argument

to extend *Roper* to a death sentence imposed against a defendant who was eighteen at the time of the offense. In rejecting this argument, the Alabama court adopted the reasoning of this Court in *Bowling* and the Florida Supreme Court in *Hill, supra*, that “*Roper* establishes a bright-line rule based on the chronological age of the defendant[.]” *Thompson*, 153 So.3d at 178.

Defendants have not simply sought to have the rationale of *Roper* extended to exclude capital punishment for defendants over the age of eighteen at the time of the offense. They have also repeatedly sought to have the cases following in *Roper*'s wake – *Graham*, *Miller*, and *Montgomery* – extended to defendants beyond the chronological age of eighteen. Again, their attempts have been uniformly rejected.

In *Romero v. State*, 105 So.3d 550 (Fla. 2012), the Florida Supreme Court rejected an attempt to apply the holding of *Graham* to declare his sentence of life without parole for second-degree murder committed when he was eighteen unconstitutional. In making his argument, the defendant asserted that – while he was eighteen at the time of the offense – the court should “overlook this fact by focusing on the juvenile nature of his mental and emotional development. He argues, in essence, that he was a juvenile in all but age.” *Id.* at 552.

The Florida court rejected this argument, noting “[n]ot a single court in this country has extended *Graham* to an adult offender.” *Id.* at 553. The court



also rejected the defendant's contention that *Graham* be applied "on a case-by-case approach." *Id.* at 554.

Presumably, this would require us to scrutinize appellant's life sentence based on his purported juvenile characteristics: low IQ, emotional immaturity, and low level education. \* \* \* Were we to apply this novel analysis and find for appellant, we would be bound to find, for example, that a life sentence for a 49 year old offender with similar juvenile traits would also be unconstitutional under the theory of diminished capacity due to his youth. We apply *Graham* as written. We decline to take the extreme act of extending *Graham* to adult offenders in the absence of a clear and explicit directive from the Supreme Court.

105 So.3d at 554.

In *United States v. Marshall*, 736 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2013), the Sixth Circuit rejected a defendant's argument to hold a mandatory minimum five year sentence was unconstitutional under *Miller*. Specifically, the defendant argued the mandatory sentence was "unconstitutional because it did not allow the district judge to sentence him based on his individual characteristics." *Id.* at 498. At the time of the offense, the defendant was between the ages of 18 and 22. *Id.*

The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, holding "[u]nder the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning juveniles and the Eighth Amendment, the only type of 'age' that matters is chronological age. The Supreme Court's decisions limiting the types of sentences that can be imposed upon juveniles all presuppose that a juvenile is an individual with a chronological age under 18." *Id.*

The Sixth Circuit continued:

The Supreme Court treats juveniles differently because they “have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.” *Miller*, 132 S.Ct. at 2464. They are often immature and irresponsible, peculiarly susceptible to bad influences, and their character is still malleable. *Id.* Marshall apparently thinks that he shares these traits and therefore believes there is no reason not to treat him differently as well. But he has ignored the crucial role that chronological age plays in our legal system and in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. The reasons for according special protections to offenders under 18 cannot be used to extend the same protections to offenders over 18.

*Id.* The Court then concluded that “Marshall is at the very most an immature adult. An immature adult is not a juvenile. Regardless of the source of the immaturity, an immature adult is still an adult. Because Marshall is not a juvenile, he does not qualify for the Eighth Amendment protections accorded to juveniles.” *Id.* at 500.

Next, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered a motion by three defendants convicted of at least one count each of murder in aid of racketeering which carried a mandatory sentence of life in prison seeking to extend *Miller* to their cases. *United States v. Lopez-Cabrera*, 2015 WL 3880503 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2015). There, the defendants “were each between the ages of 18 and 22 when they committed or participated in the murders at issue.” *Id.* at \*1.

In seeking to extend the holding of *Miller* to their cases, the defendants argued “that the factors that led the Supreme Court to rule as it did in *Miller* also apply to them because, like juveniles, persons between the ages of 18 and



22 are ‘well within a period of time of great change in the parts of the brain associated with risk assessment, impulse control, and emotional regulation,’ and the ‘capriciousness and diminished capacity of youth’ render them less morally culpable than a fully mature adult.” *Id.* quoting Defendants Brief 1-2. In other words, the defendants made the same argument Smith makes in this matter.

In rejecting this claim, the court noted “*Miller* unambiguously applies only to juveniles, as the Court’s holding was that ‘mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment,” and its analysis repeatedly referred either to juveniles or to children[.]” *Id.* at \*2. The court further noted the fact that “in the line of cases upon which *Miller* drew, the Supreme Court consistently has drawn the line at age 18 in announcing Eighth Amendment limitations on sentencing based on the defendant’s age.” *Id.* In reaching its decision not to extend *Miller*, the district court noted “every federal court of appeals to consider the issue has held that *Roper*, *Graham*, and *Miller* apply only to defendants who were younger than 18 at the time of their crimes.” *Id.* at \*3 (citations omitted).

In *Nicodemus v. State*, 392 P.3d 408 (Wyo. 2017), the defendant pled guilty to two murders committed when he was eighteen years old, and was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences. *Id.* at 410.<sup>4</sup> Following the *Miller*

---

<sup>4</sup> The Wyoming Supreme Court has held a sentence of life imprisonment under that state’s law is the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole. *Bear Cloud v. State*, 294 P.3d 36, 45 (Wyo. 2013).

and *Montgomery* decisions, the defendant filed a “motion to correct illegal sentence” on the grounds “his sentence was effectively a life sentence without the possibility of parole and that because he was a juvenile at the time he committed the crimes, such a sentence violates the Wyoming and federal constitutional protections against cruel and/or unusual punishment.” *Id.* at 411.

The defendant in *Nicodemus* based his argument for extending the holdings of *Miller* and *Montgomery* on the fact the age of majority under Wyoming law at the time he committed the offenses was nineteen. *Id.* at 414. The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, flatly rejected the argument “that the Supreme Court in *Miller* intended to announce an Eighth Amendment protection that varied depending on state law.” *Id.* In so holding, the Wyoming court stated:

Plainly, the Court in *Roper* intended to and did draw a line between juvenile and adult offenders for purposes of Eighth Amendment protections. It extended Eighth Amendment protections for juvenile offenders to those under the age of eighteen—not to those under the age of eighteen as well as any offender otherwise defined as a juvenile under state law.

*Id.* at 414.

In *Otte v. State*, 96 N.E.3d 1288 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017), the Eighth District Ohio Court of Appeals rejected an argument made by a death sentenced defendant based upon the order of the Fayette Circuit Court in this matter. In that case, the defendant sought to have the death penalty declared



unconstitutional for persons under the age of twenty-one at the time of the offense. *Id.* at 1291. He based his argument on the same claims Smith made below, *i.e.* “(1) recent scientific discoveries concerning human cognitive development, (2) intervening legal developments, and (2) society's evolving standards of decency for defining cruel and unusual punishments.” *Id.*

Noting that the Sixth Circuit had “recently observed that ‘no authority exists at the present time,’ to support the argument that the defendant in that case, Ronald Phillips, was ineligible for the Ohio death penalty because he was 19 years old at the time he committed the capital offense,” the Ohio appellate court likewise rejected Otte’s attempt to assert this claim for relief. *Id.* at 1292-1293 quoting *In re Ronald Phillips*, 6th Cir. No. 17-3729 (July 20, 2017), \*5. Otte was executed on September 13, 2017. Ronald Phillips was executed on July 26, 2017. Both were under the age of twenty-one when they committed the offenses leading to their death sentences.

This year, the Florida Supreme Court again rejected a defendant’s argument to extend *Roper* to defendants who committed their crimes in their early twenties. *Branch v. State*, 236 So.3d 981, 985-987 (Fla. 2018). In that case, the defendant “argue[d] for an expansion of *Roper* on the basis that newly discovered evidence – in the form of scientific research with respect to development of the human brain, as well as evolution of state and international law – mandates that individuals who committed murder in their late teens and early twenties be treated like juveniles.” *Id.* at 985-986.

While holding that Branch's claim regarding "scientific research with respect to brain development does not qualify as newly discovered evidence," *Id.* at 986, the Florida court noted that "the United States Supreme Court has continued to identify eighteen as the critical age for purposes of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence." *Id.* at 987. The court concluded that "unless the United States Supreme Court determines that the age of ineligibility for the death penalty should be extended, we will continue to adhere to *Roper*." *Id.* Branch was executed on February 22, 2018.

The Delaware Supreme Court has also recently rejected the argument Smith makes herein for extending the juvenile sentencing protections of *Roper*, *Graham*, and *Miller* to defendant's who had already turned eighteen at the time of the offense. *Zebroski v. State*, 179 A.3d 855 (Del. 2018). There, the defendant argued that because " 'major advances in neuroscience have demonstrated that the brain of a teenager, even at the age of 18, is profoundly different from that of a mature adult' ... the protection *Miller* extended for those under 18 should apply with equal force to those who are 18." *Id.* at 860 quoting Appellant's Opening Br. 14.

In rejecting that argument, the Delaware court stated:

While *Zebroski* suggests that only as a result of "major advances" in neuroscience has it become known that adolescent development continues beyond the age of 18, the Court was aware when it decided *Roper* that children do not transform into psychologically-and neurologically-mature adults on their eighteenth birthdays:



Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must be drawn.

*Roper's* choice of 18 as the constitutional age-of-majority was not, then, based on a now-outdated understanding of adolescent development. The Court simply rejected drawing the line any later.

*Id.* at 860 (footnotes omitted).

As seen from the cases above, while courts throughout the nation – federal and state – have repeatedly been asked to extend *Roper* and its progeny to offenders over the age of eighteen such as Smith, every court has rejected the suggestion. This includes rejecting arguments that new scientific developments show brain development continues past the age of eighteen. The courts, however, have rightly recognized that the Supreme Court in *Roper* acknowledged such development continues, but made a decision to draw the line for considering juveniles different under the Eighth Amendment at that age. This Court should follow those courts, and its own prior precedent in *Bowling, supra*.

**D. The trial court erred in finding a national consensus against imposing the death penalty on persons under the age of twenty-one**

In its order granting Diaz's motion that the death penalty is unconstitutional for offenders under the age of twenty-one, the trial court

found there was a national consensus against such sentences. That finding is not supported by the evidence presented to the trial court.

In reaching its decision, the trial court first noted that nineteen states and the District of Columbia have completely abolished the death penalty (TR V, 665). As such, there are thirty-one states that currently employ the death penalty as a potential sentence for a capital offense (*Id.*). As such, since *Roper*, only six additional states have moved to abolish the death penalty.

The main distinguishing fact between this case and the indicia of national consensus the Supreme Court found in *Roper* and *Atkins* is that none of the thirty-one states with the death penalty exclude persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one from the provisions of the penalty. In *Atkins*, by contrast, eighteen of the thirty-eight states with the death penalty at the time excluded the intellectually disabled from its reach. 536 U.S. at 313-315. As such, a majority of the states – thirty out of fifty – precluded the death penalty for intellectually disabled persons when *Atkins* was before the Court.

Likewise, in *Roper*, the Court was confronted with evidence that thirty (30) states precluded the death penalty for persons under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense. 543 U.S. at 564. That included the twelve states with outright prohibition and eighteen states “that maintain it but, by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach.” *Id.* The Court in *Roper* also was able to account for the “slower pace of abolition of the juvenile death penalty” in the years since its decision in *Stanford*, than what



the Court encountered between its decisions in *Penry v. Lynaugh*, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) and *Atkins*.

When we heard *Stanford*, by contrast, 12 death penalty States had already prohibited the execution of any juvenile under 18, and 15 had prohibited the execution of any juvenile under 17. If anything, this shows the impropriety of executing juveniles between 16 and 18 years of age gained wide recognition earlier than the impropriety of executing the [intellectually disabled].

*Roper*, 543 U.S. at 566-567 (alteration added).

There is simply nothing approaching the level of national consensus for prohibiting the death penalty for persons under the age of twenty-one like the Supreme Court found in *Roper* and *Atkins*. As opposed to the evidence that a majority of the states precluded the classes of people under consideration in those cases from the reach of the death penalty, in this case there are only the nineteen states that have abolished the penalty for all offenders in support of the purported consensus. There are no states maintaining the penalty that have moved to preclude its application to those under twenty-one at the time of the offense.

In order to try to increase the number of states in an attempt to create a showing of consensus in this matter, the trial court had to engage in logical acrobatics. First, the trial court noted that four states – Pennsylvania, Washington, Colorado, and Oregon – currently have moratoriums on executions that have been imposed during the last five years. While that is certainly true, the moratoriums are simply to prohibit the carrying out of

executions. There are no moratoriums in those states as to new death sentences being imposed, much less moratoriums on death sentences being imposed on offenders under the age of twenty-one. Oregon, for example, had a death sentence imposed in 2014, after the moratorium on carrying out executions was put in place. Washington had a death sentence imposed in 2013. Pennsylvania's governor imposed a moratorium on carrying out executions in February 2015, but seven death sentences have been imposed in that state since that time.

Secondly, the trial court found seven states – including Kentucky – “have *de facto* prohibitions on the executions of offenders under twenty-one (21) years of age[.]” (TR V, 665). That is simply not a valid finding of fact. In Kentucky, for example, there is not a *de facto* prohibition on executing persons under twenty-one. In fact, there is a temporary injunction issued by the Franklin Circuit Court enjoining the Commonwealth from carrying out any executions pending the review of its execution protocol following the rulemaking procedure. That injunction is in no way connected to the execution of offenders under the age of twenty-one, it applies to all offenders.

As for the other six states, the fact they have not carried out executions since 1977 (Kansas and New Hampshire) or have not carried out executions of persons under the age of twenty-one at the time of the offense, does not change the fact that those states have the death penalty as a sentencing option and do not preclude its application to offenders between the ages of eighteen and



twenty-one. Rather, those facts are more likely attributable to the small numbers of persons those states have on their death rows in general.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, the lack of executions being carried out in these states is more likely a result of the increasing difficulty states face in obtaining drugs with which to carry out executions than any *de facto* bar on the execution of persons under the age of twenty-one as the trial court found. *See Glossip v. Gross*, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2733-2734 (2015).

It was clearly erroneous for the trial court to include these eleven states in its calculation of the number of states prohibiting the execution of persons under the age of twenty-one. Simply put, these states do not preclude the death penalty nor do they preclude persons under the age of twenty-one from its reach.

The trial court's order also shows there is not a declining trend of the practice of carrying out death sentences imposed upon defendants between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. As the trial court noted, between 2011 and 2016, nine states carried out death sentences of defendants who were under the age of twenty-one at the time of the offense (TR V, 666). The trial court found this indicia of a national consensus, but it pales in comparison to *Roper* where the Supreme Court noted only three states had executed juvenile defendants in the ten years prior to the decision, and only six had done so in

---

<sup>5</sup> Kansas and Idaho each have nine persons on death row, Utah has eight, and Montana, New Hampshire, and Wyoming each have one. Not surprisingly, those states also have relatively small populations in general.

the sixteen years between *Roper* and *Stanford*. *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 564-565. Going back to the year *Roper* was decided – 2005 – thirteen states have carried out death sentences against defendants who were under twenty-one at the time of the offense. In other words, forty-two percent of the states permitting the death penalty have carried out executions of persons under twenty-one at the time of the offense since *Roper* was decided. That is a far cry from an indicia of national consensus against the practice.

In its order, the trial court relied upon idea that the number of executions carried out against persons under the age of twenty-one since 2011 “has been cut in half from the two (2) previous five (5) year periods” as proof of a national consensus, but that ignores the fact that states have encountered extreme difficulties in carrying out executions at all since 2011 which corresponds to the year when Hospira – “[t]he sole American manufacturer of sodium thiopental” – ceased production of the drug. *See Glossip*, 135 S.Ct. at 2733. As the first drug in the protocol approved by the Court in *Baze v. Rees*, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion), the inability to obtain the drug made it simply impossible for many states to carry out executions at all since that time.

Despite this, the record in this matter shows that executions of persons under the age of twenty-one remain a steady percentage of the number of executions annually. In 2011 (excluding Texas), seven of thirty executions were of persons under twenty-one. In 2016, the number was two out of thirteen; in 2017, four out of sixteen persons were executed for crimes



committed when they were twenty-one or younger. Thus, the number of persons executed remains about the same percentage of the total number of executions carried out while excluding Texas.

The trial court was clearly erroneous to look at this information and determine there was indicia of a national consensus against the execution of persons under the age of twenty-one. That is simply not the case when the evidence is looked at objectively, and in light of the difficulties states have in carrying out executions at all. In no way does the evidence present a picture remotely near what the Supreme Court found when it decided *Atkins* and *Roper*. This Court must find the trial court erred.

**E. The science the trial court relied upon is simply not new**

In its order, the trial court also concluded the death penalty was disproportionate for persons under the age of twenty-one based upon “studies supporting the conclusion that individuals under twenty-one (21) years of age are categorically less culpable in the same ways that the Court in *Roper* decided individuals under eighteen (18) were less culpable.” (TR V, 667). The problem with the trial court’s conclusion is the science underlying those studies is simply not recent. In fact, it is the same science that was presented to the Supreme Court in *Roper*, *Graham*, and *Miller* which the Court reviewed and determined to draw its line at eighteen years of age.

In its order, the trial court noted that “study of brain development conducted in the past ten (10) years has shown that these key brain systems

and structures actually continue to mature well into the mid-twenties[.]” (TR V, 668). However, this same information was presented to the Supreme Court in the *Amicus Curiae* brief of the American Psychological Association, et. al. filed with the Court in *Roper*.

Therein, it was stated “[r]ecent research suggests a biological dimension to adolescent behavioral immaturity: the human brain does not settle into its mature, adult form until after the adolescent years have passed and a person has entered young adulthood.” *Roper*, Brief of *Amici Curiae* for the American Psychological Association, 2004 WL 1636447, \* 9. The brief went into great detail of the processes discussed by the trial court herein – synaptic pruning and myelination. *Id.* at \*10. The brief further explicitly stated “[l]ate maturation of the frontal lobes is also consistent with electroencephalogram (EEG) research showing that the frontal executive region matures from ages 17 to 21 – after maturation appears to cease in other brain regions.” *Id.* at \*14.

The research laid out in the *Amicus* brief in *Roper* is the same as what Dr. Steinberg presented to the trial court in this matter. Again, it is simply not a new development. In *Morton v. State*, 995 So.2d 233 (Fla. 2008), a death sentenced defendant asserted the trial court had “erred in denying his claim that newly discovered evidence from a 2004 brain mapping study, which establishes that sections of the human brain are not fully developed until age twenty-five, warrants a reweighing of his age as a mitigating factor. *Id.* at 245.



The Florida court concluded the 2004 study was not newly discovered evidence because similar research existed at the time of his trial.

Although this 2004 brain mapping study had not yet been published at the time of Morton's trials, Morton or his counsel could have discovered similar research at that time that stated that the human brain was not fully developed until early adulthood. See Jay D. Aronson, *Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty*, 13 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 115, 120 (2007) ("In the past few decades ... neuroscientists have discovered that two key developmental processes, myelination ... and pruning of neural connections, continue to take place during adolescence and well into adulthood.... [B]rain regions responsible for basic life processes and sensory perception tend to mature fastest, whereas the regions responsible for behavioral inhibition and control, risk assessment, decision making, and emotion maturing take longer (Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967).").

*Morton*, 995 So.2d at 245-246. As the 2007 Aronson paper shows, research had shown the two key processes relied upon by Dr. Steinberg in his testimony – myelination and pruning “take place ... well into adulthood” as early as 1967.

The idea that brain maturity and development continue into late adolescence and young adulthood, particularly in “parts of the brain involved in behavior control,” *Graham*, 560 U.S. at 80, has been well presented and documented to the Supreme Court and other courts throughout the country long before this matter appeared in the trial court. The Supreme Court explicitly recognized this in *Roper* when it stated “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.” *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 574.

Despite this recognition, the Supreme Court elected to draw a bright line at the age of eighteen for purposes of its juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. The Court has not seen fit to move that line as its cases have progressed from *Roper* despite being presented with the continuing research of the American Psychological Association under the guidance of Dr. Steinberg who oversaw the research for that groups *Amicus* briefs in *Roper*, *Graham*, and *Miller*.

While the Supreme Court' election to draw the bright line rule for juvenile sentencing purposes at age eighteen was based on "where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood." *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 574. As the Delaware Supreme Court has recently stated:

Although *Roper*, *Miller*, and *Graham* were all rooted in "psychology and brain science," *Roper's* choice to divide childhood from adulthood at age 18 was not based solely—and perhaps not even primarily—on scientific evidence. After examining the "scientific and sociological" differences between children and adults, and using that evidence to show that juveniles tend to be less culpable for their behavior, *Roper* then "retreat[ed]" from the science "to [a] more conventional, law-controlled analysis" when the time came to decide who would count as a juvenile:

The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.

The choice of age 18 was not, then, an attempt to identify—using the most advanced science of the time—the developmental boundary between childhood and adulthood. It was based on societal markers of adulthood—the age at which the states allow individuals to "vot[e], serv[e] on juries, [and] marry[ ] without parental consent."



For Zebroski, this means that developments in neuroscience do not necessarily support moving the line that *Roper* drew. It was not science that convinced the Court where to draw that line—it was society's collective judgment about when the rights and responsibilities of adulthood should accrue. And in the twelve years that have passed since *Roper*, 18 is still “the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”

*Zebroski v. State*, 179 A.3d 855, 862 (Del. 2018).

The Delaware court properly concluded that eighteen has remained the age at which childhood ends and adulthood begins in the years since *Roper* was decided. That is the age at which most are provided the right to vote, the right to marry without parental consent, the right to enter into contracts, the right to sue and be sued, and the right to join the armed forces.

This is true despite the fact a person's brain continues to mature for some period of years past that age. For that reason, this Court should reverse the order of the trial court in this matter, and maintain the line drawn by the United States Supreme Court – adopted by this Court in *Bowling* – that an offender over the age of eighteen at the time of the offense may be subject to the death penalty.


**CONCLUSION**

Based upon the foregoing, the order of the Fayette Circuit Court declaring Kentucky's death penalty statute unconstitutional must be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

**ANDY BESHEAR**

Attorney General of Kentucky

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. B. Moore", written over the printed name of Jason B. Moore.

**JASON B. MOORE**

Assistant Attorney General

Office of Criminal Appeals

1024 Capital Center Drive

Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

(502) 696-5342

Counsel for the Commonwealth